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ABSTRACT—Just as neurons interconnect in networks that
create structured thoughts beyond the ken of any individ-
ual neuron, so people spontaneously organize themselves
into groups to create emergent organizations that no
individual may intend, comprehend, or even perceive.
Recent technological advances have provided us with
unprecedented opportunities for conducting controlled
laboratory experiments on human collective behavior. We
describe two experimental paradigms in which we attempt
to build predictive bridges between the beliefs, goals, and
cognitive capacities of individuals andpatterns of behavior
at the group level, showing how the members of a group
dynamically allocate themselves to resources and how
innovations diffuse through a social network. Agent-based
computational models have provided useful explanatory
and predictive accounts. Together, the models and exper-
iments point to tradeoffs between exploration and exploi-
tation—that is, compromises between individuals using
their own innovations and using innovations obtained from
their peers—and the emergence of group-level organiza-
tions such as population waves, bandwagon effects, and
spontaneous specialization.
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It is natural for psychologists to focus on the behavior of single
individuals, because introspection provides people with moti-
vation and perspective at this level. However, in a literal sense,
we are all participating in entities greater than ourselves. Self-
organized collectives of people create emergent group-level
patterns that are rarely understood or intended by any individ-
ual. A business has a style and ethos that transcends its em-
ployees. A culture has a nature, integrity, and systematicity that
transcends its inhabitants while still being grounded by their
interactions (Atran, Medin, & Ross, 2005). Social phenomena
such as the spread of gossip, theWorld-WideWeb, the popularity
of cultural icons, legal systems, and scientific establishments all
take on a life of their own, complete with their own self-organized
divisions of labor and specialization, dynamics, feedback loops,
growth, and adaptations.
A considerable amount of early work on group behavior from
social psychology focused on interpersonal relations and the
attributes that characterize good leaders or work teams. How-
ever, the social patterns that people form are often organized
without explicit leaders, chains of command, or fixed commu-
nication networks (Ball, 2004). Examples of such spontaneously
emerging social patterns include book recommendations on
Amazon.com (which evolve based upon similar readers’ buying
habits), fans at a sport stadium, grassroots political movements,
the development of a fully cross-indexed and intricately orga-
nized online encyclopedia that any person can edit (www.
wikipedia.org), and an online venue for media sharing that is
freely accessible to both providers and consumers yet still shows
striking trends of rich-get-richer popularity (www.youtube.com).
In December of 2006, Timemagazine named ‘‘You’’ as Person of
the Year in recognition of the power and sophistication of these
grass-roots, decentralized communities.
To understand the structure and dynamics of human collec-
tives like these, we have developed Internet-based experimental
platforms that allow groups of 20 to 200 people to interact with
each other in real time on networked computers. The experi-
ments use virtual environments in which participants can see the
moment-to-moment actions of their peers and immediately re-
spond to their environment by making responses of their own. To
understand the results of these experiments, we have developed
computational models. Several models of group behavior exist,
but rarely are these models tested against detailed data sets
obtained from controlled laboratory settings. Often there is a
disconcerting mismatch between the simplicity of formal models
and the complexities of real-world situations. Our strategy for
bridging the gap between computational models and group-
behavior phenomena is to create relatively simple laboratory
situations involving groups of people interacting in idealized
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environments according to easily stated ‘‘game rules.’’ We ad-
mittedly sacrifice some external validity in creating idealized
experimental scenarios, but this loss is offset by the nearly exact
correspondence of the assumptions underlying our psychologi-
cal experiments to those of the computational models; this allows
the models to be aptly applied without sacrificing their concise
explanatory value and genuine predictiveness. In what follows,
we focus on two scenarios that capture ubiquitous group pat-
terns: the competition of agents for resources and the dissemi-
nation of innovations in social networks.
THE COMPETITIVE SEARCH FOR RESOURCES
A problem faced by all mobile organisms is how to search their
environment for resources. Animals forage their environment for
food,Web-users surf the Internet for desired data, and industries
mine the land for valuable minerals. When an organism forages
in an environment that consists, in part, of other organisms that
are also foraging, unique complexities arise. The resources
available to each individual are affected not just by that indi-
vidual’s behavior but also by the simultaneous actions of other
individuals.
We have been interested in experimentally exploring how
human foragers allocate themselves to resources and the time
course bywhich that allocation is achieved. Through the Internet
(available to the public at http://groups.psych.indiana.edu/),
eight groups of 12 to 28 (average5 21) participants competed for
food tokens deposited over time in a virtual environment con-
sisting of an 80 80 grid of squares. In Goldstone and Ashpole
(2004), a virtual environment was created with two resource
pools into which valued food tokens could be deposited with
different rates of replenishment. Each pool consisted of a com-
pact region of many squares. The participants’ task was to obtain
as many resource tokens as possible during the course of a 270-
second experiment. A participant obtained a token by being the
first tomove on top of it. Participantsmoved square-by-square by
pressing arrow keys on their computer keyboard.
Resources were divided between two resource pools in various
ways. For example, in one condition, food tokens were split
evenly (50/50) between the two pools; other conditions had a 65/
35 or 80/20 split. The location of the foodwithin a pool followed a
normal (Gaussian) distribution with a mean at the center of the
pool and a standard deviation of five horizontal and vertical
positions. The locations of the pools were randomized under the
constraint that the distance between pools was kept approxi-
mately constant. One piece of food was delivered to one of the
resource pools every 4/N seconds, where N is the number of
participants. In our ‘‘visible’’ condition, each participant could
see each other and the entire food distribution. In our ‘‘invisible’’
condition, they could not see the other participants, and so they
gradually acquired knowledge of the resource distributions by
virtue of their histories of getting food from each location.
The dynamics of the distribution of agents to resources in each
condition are shown in Figure 1, broken down by the three types
of resource distribution. Although fast adaptation to the food
distributions takes place, the asymptotic distribution of agents
systematically undermatches the optimal distribution of agents
to resource pools. By undermatching, we mean a distribution of
agents that is less uneven than the distribution of resources. For
example, in the 65/35 distribution, the 65% pool only attracts an
average of 60.6%of the agents. If wewere efficiency consultants,
we would recommend that some foragers in the less productive
pool move to the more productive pool, as the resources there are
being relatively underutilized despite the larger crowd. This
finding of undermatching has been obtained with other animal
groups, including cichlid fish, mallard ducks, and mites (Ken-
nedy & Gray, 1993). We have also observed this undermatching
in collectives of citizens of the virtual world Second Life (http://
secondlife.com/), who were invited to forage for pieces of the
world’s currency that we randomly placed in two regions. This
undermatching may also explain real-world human foraging
behavior, such as the documented inefficiency in sperm whalers’
hunting for whales near the Galapagos Islands in the early 19th
century (Whitehead & Hope, 1991).
Our results also reveal periodic fluctuations in resource use. A
Fourier analysis was applied to the populations at the resource
pools over time to reveal cyclic oscillations of migration. Fourier
transformations translate a time-varying signal into a set of si-
nusoidal components. Each sinusoidal component is charac-
terized by a frequency. The power of a component indicates the
strength of a periodic response at that frequency. This analysis
revealed significantly greater power in the low-frequency
spectra for invisible conditions than for visible conditions. For
all three invisible conditions, the peak power was at approxi-
mately .02 cycles/second and was particularly high for the most
uneven, 80/20 distribution. This means that in the invisible
conditions, agents collectively caused waves of relatively dense
crowding at one pool that repeated about once every 50 seconds.
There was no evidence for population cycles in the visible
conditions, presumably because a person who was tempted to
leave their dissatisfying pool for greener pastures would be
dissuaded if they saw several other people with the same idea
already leaving their pool. However, in invisible conditions,
agents may become dissatisfied with a pool populated with many
other agents, but as they leave such a pool they would not be
aware that other agents are also leaving. Thus, the ironic con-
sequence of people’s shared desire to avoid crowds is the
emergence of migratory crowds!
In a second experiment (Goldstone, Ashpole, & Roberts,
2005), we ran groups of participants in conditions where food
resources, but not fellow foragers, were visible, and vice versa. If
people acted like buzzards, using the presence of peers as an
indicator of possible food sources, then the presence of a rela-
tively large number of participants at the richer pool would be
expected to draw still more participants to the pool. In fact, when
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agents can see each other but not the overall pattern of food, their
distribution is not uneven enough (e.g., only 62% of the par-
ticipants were at the 65% pool), but when agents can see food
resources but not each other, then their distribution is more
uneven than the resource distribution (e.g., 73% of the partici-
pants were at the 65% pool). This suggests that people are more
like some aphid species than like buzzards, avoiding sites that
already have a large crowd of other members of their own spe-
cies. By this account, overmatching occurred because partici-
pants were attracted to the rich, productive pools, and were not
dissuaded from approaching these pools by the presence of other
participants (because those others were invisible).
To gain greater insight into our results, we chose tomodel them
using an Agent-Based Model. This class of models builds social
structures ‘‘from the bottom up,’’ by populating the simulation
with many individual virtual agents and allowing emergent or-
ganizations to form out of the operation of rules that govern
interactions among these agents and their environment. Our
EPICURE model (Roberts & Goldstone, 2006, available as an
interactive simulation at http://cognitrn.psych.indiana.edu/
Epicure.html) populates a world with agents that probabilistic-
ally decide from moment to moment what spatial grid location
they will approach based on the locations’ values. The first factor
that affects a location’s value is its distance: The closer a location
is, the more likely it is to be selected as a target destination.
Second, once a location has been selected as a target, its value is
increased so that it will tend to be selected as a target at the next
moment too. This is a way of incorporating consistency in target
choices over time. For agents who can see all of the other agents
and food, a third factor is that the value of a location increases as
the density of food in its vicinity increases, and a fourth one is
that the location’s value decreases as the density of other agents
increases. In the invisible condition, agents must gradually ac-
cumulate a personal history of where they have found food. Every
time food is found at a location, the location’s value increases,
and this increase diffuses to the nearby locations.
These simple assumptions allowed EPICURE to account for
the empirically observed pattern of overmatching and under-
matching for the four visibility conditions in which foragers and
food could independently be visible or invisible. Why does
EPICURE predict undermatching? The critical notion is spatial
‘‘turfs.’’ A single agent can efficiently patrol a compact region of
about 10 squares, roughly independent of the food productivity.
Two pools that differ in their productivity both have the same
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Fig. 1. Changes in the number of people at each of two resource pools across 270-second foraging experiments (Goldstone &
Ashpole, 2004). Resources were distributed evenly (50/50) or with unequal (65/35 or 80/20) distributions. Participants either
were shown the positions of other participants and resources (visible) or not (invisible). The actual distributions of resources
(indicated by the straight horizontal lines) are more extreme than the distributions of participants to these resources.
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spatial extent and variance, and so can support agents in num-
bers that are more similar than predicted by the pools’ produc-
tivities alone. EPICURE also predicted our observed population
waves in the invisible conditions, as well as other counterintu-
itive results found in animal foraging, such as that increasing the
distance between two resource pools—and hence increasing
travel cost—should decrease undermatching (Baum & Kraft,
1998). One of the best ways to evaluate a model is to see whether
behaviors that are not explicitly forced by the rules arise—in
other words, are we getting out more than we knew we were
putting in themodel? By this measure, the model does a good job
of explaining collective foraging behavior. Although under-
matching and population waves were not explicitly stipulated
by the model’s assumptions, these behaviors emerge because of
agents’ tendencies to avoid each other but to be attracted by the
same resources.
DISSEMINATING INNOVATIONS IN SOCIAL
NETWORKS
The foraging paradigm involves competitive searching for spa-
tial resources, but we have also studied collective searching for
abstract resources. Any organism that is capable of imitating its
peers must decide when and how much to imitate others’ solu-
tions versus discover its own solutions. To study this in a well-
controlled, if somewhat artificial, setting, we had participants
guess numbers between 0 and 100 using Internet-connected
computers (Mason, Jones, & Goldstone, 2005). Each of the
participants’ computers then showed them the points earned by
their guesses, based upon a hidden scoring function that had
either a simple single-peaked or complex triple-peaked form,
shown in Figure 2. The triple-peaked form had two local max-
ima—solutions that were better than their neighboring solutions
but not the best possible—and one global maximum. Over 15
rounds, participants received feedback not only on their own
guesses but also on their neighbors’ guesses. Neighbors were
determined by one of four types of network structures: locally
connected (connections only to one’s immediate neighbors),
random, fully connected (everybody connected to everybody
else), and small-world (e.g. local connections plus a few long-
range connections). Figure 2 shows sample networks for groups
with 10 participants.
For the easy, single-peaked function, participants in the fully
connected networks converged most quickly on the global
maximum, with the random and locally connected networks
performing worse. This pattern of results is readily explainable
in terms of the propensity of a network to disseminate innova-
tions quickly. Innovations disseminate most quickly in the full
network because every individual is informationally connected
to every other individual. For the trickier, three-peaked payout
function, the small-world network performs better than the fully
connected network, particularly for the first half of the trials. The
truism of ‘‘the more information, the better’’ is not supported.
Indeed, problem spaces requiring substantial exploration may
benefit from networks withmostly locally connected individuals.
The problem with the fully connected network is that everybody
ends up knowing the same information, and they thereby become
too like-minded, acting like a single explorer rather than like a
federation of independent explorers. The small-world structure
is an effective compromise between fully exploring a search
.00
.10
.20
.30
.40
.50
.60
.70
.80
.90
1.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Round
Fully Connected 
RandomSmall World Locally Connected 
One-Peaked Problem Space 
Guess
Sc
or
e
.00
.10
.20
.30
.40
.50
.60
.70
.80
.90
1.00
Round
Small World
Fully Connected 
Random
Triple-Peaked Problem Space 
Guess
Sc
or
e
Fig. 2. Percentage of participants within one standard deviation of the
global maximum (best solution) on each round of a problem-solving task
for which there were two versions (Mason, Jones, & Goldstone, 2005).
Groups of participants guessed numbers between 0 and 100 using Internet-
connected computers; each of the participants’ computers then showed
them the points earned by their own and others’ guesses, based upon a
hidden scoring function that had either a simple single-peaked (single-
peaked problem space) or complex triple-peaked (triple-peaked problem
space) form. In the fully connected network, everybody could see each
other’s guesses and outcomes. In the random network, participants only
had access to a set of randomly determined neighbors. In the locally con-
nected network, participants were informationally connected only to their
close neighbors. The small-world network also preserved local neighbor-
hoods but additionally had a few distant ‘‘short-cut’’ connections that
bridged different local regions. For the one-peaked problem, the best
group performance was initially found for the fully connected network.
For the triple-peaked problem, the best performance was initially found
for the small-world network.
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space and also quickly disseminating good solutions once they
are found (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). When the problem space is
even trickier than the three-peaked function, with a single sharp
needle peak for the global maximum and a broad local maxi-
mum, then the locally connected network performs best, con-
sistent with its preservation of local and quasi-independent
communities. Computational modeling work converges on these
empirical results in showing that more locally connected social
networks are beneficial when the problem the group has to solve
is difficult (Hutchins, 1995; Lazer & Friedman, in press).
Increasing connectivity among members of real-world cockpit
crews has also been shown to hamper group performance by
foreclosing exploration (Hutchins, 1995; see also Hinsz, Tin-
dale, & Vollrath, 1997 for a discussion of the danger of groups’
over-reliance on shared information).
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR RESEARCH ON
COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR
The previously described paradigms are united in exploring
group search behavior in both physical and abstract solution
spaces. In related work, we have examined the kinds of trail
systems that people create when they are motivated to take ad-
vantage of the trails left by their predecessors and, in so doing,
further reinforce and extend those trails (Goldstone & Roberts,
2006). The resulting trails represent a compromise between
going where one wants to go and going where others have gone
before. We have begun to apply this work on imitation and
exploration to modeling and predicting baby names. Names are
interesting because they are roughly neutral in terms of intrinsic
value but are culturally meaningful artifacts. ‘‘John’’ is not in-
trinsically a better name than ‘‘Warren’’ even though it occurs 35
times more frequently in the United States. The distribution of
baby names strongly suggests that, as with trails and scholarly
citations, the more often a name is used, the more often it will be
used in the future.
Other promising areas for experimental research on collective
behavior include coalition formation and coordination, social
dilemmas, group dynamics, and social specialization. The
common principles that repeatedly arise in our group-behavior
paradigms include (a) a tradeoff between exploration and
exploitation, (b) a compromise between individuals using
self- versus other-obtained information, and (c) the emergence
of group-level resource usage patterns that result from indi-
vidual interests but are not always favorable to those interests.
Unfavorable manifestations of these principles include ineffi-
cient population waves, bandwagon effects (in which people do
things because other people do the same), mismatches between
agent and resource distributions, disadvantages for highly con-
nected networks, and premature convergence of populations
on suboptimal solutions. Despite these pitfalls, collective search
continues to be a powerful case of distributed cognition for
the simple reason that individual search often fails to provide a
good solution in a limited time, and thus collaborating and
sharing solutions with others can dramatically improve search
efficiency.
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